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Editorial
The language of data privacy law (and how it
differs from reality)
Christopher Kuner*, Dan Jerker B. Svantesson**, Fred H. Cate***,
Orla Lynskey***, and Christopher Millard***
Legal language often contains vague, general wording
that actually means very little unless read in a specific
context. But legal language also includes clear absolute
statements from which no variation seems possible.
This is the case when one examines data privacy law.
Where used appropriately, the first type—the vague,
general wording—is commonly found as expressions of
principles that require a flexible interpretation. The fo-
cus on concepts such as ‘adequacy’ and ‘proportionality’
are clear examples of this. The second type—the clear
absolute statements—are often (appropriately) found as
expressions of fundamental rights. Both types of word-
ing may, however, be problematic, as can be seen from
the example of European Union (EU) data protection
law.
Consider, for example, Article 24(1) of the forthcom-
ing EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679:
Taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes
of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and se-
verity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the
controller shall implement appropriate technical and organ-
isational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate
that processing is performed in accordance with this
Regulation. (emphasis added)
Even where there is a strong and genuine desire to com-
ply with such a rule, actual compliance can never be
more than a guess made by those seeking to abide by
the rule in question. Put differently, there is no realistic
way to know in advance whether one is indeed comply-
ing with this rule or not. Thus, uncertainty lies ahead,
potentially for many years to come.
Consider also Article 3(1) of the forthcoming
Regulation (with its counterpart found in Article
4(1)(a) of the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46):
‘This Regulation applies to the processing of personal
data in the context of the activities of an establishment
of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of
whether the processing takes place in the Union or not’.
Despite the fact that the Directive has operated with
similar language for 21 years, and despite the volumi-
nous discussions of the forthcoming Regulation, it re-
mains unclear what is meant by the processing of
personal data in the context of the activities of an estab-
lishment of a controller. In a Directive, this type of
vagueness may perhaps be explained, to some degree, by
reference to a desire to accommodate differing imple-
mentations amongst the Member States. However, such
an excuse cannot be maintained in the context of a
Regulation. For the Regulation, the vagueness appears
instead to be the result of compromises being struck
during the complex drafting process. Whatever the rea-
son, leaving a clear interpretation of this phrase to
evolve over time is not good lawmaking—clearer, more
precise, language would have been helpful for several
reasons. As noted by HLA Hart:
The principal functions of the law as a means of social con-
trol are not to be seen in private litigation or prosecutions,
which represent vital but still ancillary provisions for the
failures of the system. It is to be seen in the diverse ways in
which the law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life
out of court.1
Given the lack of precision in the language, and the lack
of predictability that it creates, it cannot be expected
that Article 3(1) of the forthcoming Regulation ade-
quately allows us to control, to guide, and to plan life
out of court. Indeed, the likelihood of it being inter-
preted uniformly among the EU Member States is slim,
and a uniform interpretation among the data control-
lers and data processors governed by this rule is an im-
possibility until further clarification is provided in
binding form.
Similar concerns arise in relation to various other
parts of the Regulation, not least due to the fact that
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not been given defined meanings, either in the Directive
or in the Regulation.
A different type of problem can be found, for exam-
ple, in Article 7(2) of the Regulation:
If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a writ-
ten declaration which also concerns other matters, the re-
quest for consent shall be presented in a manner which is
clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelli-
gible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language.
The ambition behind this rule is, of course, commend-
able. However, data privacy law is often complex and
the implications of acts such as transferring personal
data overseas do not lend themselves to being explained
‘in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear
and plain language’. What hope is there for the average
individual to evaluate the ultimate implications of data
processing no matter how clear and plain the language
that is used? Thus, there is a troubling disconnect be-
tween what the rule in question is seeking to achieve
and any result it realistically may hope to produce. In
light of all this, there is little surprise in the findings of a
recent survey indicating that: ‘[o]nly four percent of re-
spondents outside of Europe said they are very knowl-
edgeable about the details of GDPR, while just six
percent of those in Europe said they are very familiar
with the requirements.’2
But these issues do not only arise in legislation, and
can also be found in expressions of how the law is being
applied. Consider, for example, the following aspect of
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’s interpre-
tation of the (in)famous Google Spain judgment of the
Court of Justice of the EU:
Although concrete solutions may vary depending on the in-
ternal organization and structure of search engines, de-
listing decisions must be implemented in a way that guar-
antees the effective and complete protection of these rights
and that EU law cannot be easily circumvented . . . . In prac-
tice, this means that in any case de-listing should also be ef-
fective on all relevant domains, including .com.3 (emphasis
added)
This statement illustrates both of the language problems
alluded to in the introduction. First of all, it is unneces-
sarily and troublingly vague in that it refers to ‘all rele-
vant domains’ without providing any clues whatsoever
as to what makes a domain ‘relevant’. It also contains
unrealistically absolute language in that it refers to im-
plementation that guarantees the effective and complete
protection of these rights and that EU law cannot be eas-
ily circumvented. There is certainly only one form of im-
plementation that guarantees the effective and complete
protection of these rights: that is, delisting with world-
wide effect. But then: (i) why the reference to all relevant
domains? (ii) and what about the fact that such an ap-
proach sets a dangerous precedent internationally? If vi-
olations of local EU law must result in worldwide
blocking what about content that violates local laws in
North Korea or Russia? and (iii) given that the Google
Spain judgment makes clear that the original content
may remain online, the right expressed in the judgment
is not aimed at guaranteeing complete protection in an
absolute sense, so why insist on complete protection in
a geographical sense?
Having said all this, we acknowledge that legal lan-
guage must include both vague, general wording that
may mean very little unless read in a specific context, as
well as clear absolute statements from which no varia-
tion seems possible. The trick is, of course, to use these
linguistic tools appropriately, and it may perhaps be ar-
gued that improvements still can be made in that regard
as far as data privacy law is concerned. In fact, where
the mentioned linguistic tools are used inappropriately,
they lead to a kind of regulatory outsourcing through lin-
guistic vagueness—the lawmakers capitulate, leaving it
to the controllers to interpret and implement the vague
rules to the best of their abilities, and of course, under
the threat of being pursued by the data protection au-
thorities, should their implementation subsequently be
regarded as being inadequate.
It is impossible to ignore the irony of lawmakers and
regulators using vague and often opaque language, on
the one hand, while pushing controllers to communi-
cate in more clear and understandable terms, on the
other. Maybe data protection officials should take some
of their own medicine to make data protection law
more comprehensible, more predictable, and the pro-
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